New HTTP/2 Bomb Vulnerability Allows Remote DoS on NGINX, Apache, IIS, Envoy & Cloudflare
Overview
Security researchers have identified a newly disclosed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack technique, dubbed HTTP/2 Bomb, which targets systems using the HTTP/2 protocol and can rapidly exhaust server memory, leading to service disruption and application outages. The vulnerability affects the default HTTP/2 configurations of several widely deployed web servers and reverse proxies, including NGINX, Apache HTTP Server, Microsoft IIS, Envoy, and Cloudflare Pingora.
The attack can be launched from a single machine with relatively low bandwidth requirements. By exploiting weaknesses in HTTP/2 header compression (HPACK) and flow-control mechanisms, attackers can force vulnerable servers to allocate excessive amounts of memory while preventing those resources from being released. As a result, a single attacker with modest resources can consume tens of gigabytes of server memory within seconds, potentially rendering web applications and services unavailable to legitimate users. This low-cost, high-impact attack poses a significant risk to organizations operating internet-facing HTTP/2-enabled services and web infrastructure.
Threat Details :
Vulnerability Name: HTTP/2 Bomb
CVE ID: CVE-2026-49975
Severity: High
Vulnerability Type: Denial of Service (DoS)
Affected Component: HTTP/2 Protocol Implementations
Attack Vector: Network (Unauthenticated)
Public PoC Availability: Security research details publicly available
Exploitation Status: Publicly disclosed; exploitation feasible with low attacker resources
The HTTP/2 Bomb attack combines two known HTTP/2 attack techniques:
1. HPACK Compression Amplification
- HTTP/2 uses a compression mechanism called HPACK to reduce header size.
- Attackers can abuse this feature by sending very small requests that trigger disproportionately large memory allocations on the server.
- In some cases, a single byte sent by an attacker can result in thousands of bytes of memory being allocated by the server.
2. HTTP/2 Flow-Control Stalling
- After forcing memory allocation, attackers prevent the server from completing the connection and releasing the allocated resources.
- This is achieved by manipulating HTTP/2 flow-control mechanisms, causing memory consumption to continue growing over time.
- Periodic 1-byte WINDOW_UPDATE frames keep the connection alive and prevent timeout expiration.
The combination allows memory consumption to accumulate indefinitely until resource exhaustion occurs.
Researchers demonstrated that a single system connected through a 100 Mbps internet connection could consume up to 32 GB of server memory in less than 20 seconds on some platforms.
A Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploit for the attack has already been published, increasing the likelihood of exploitation attempts.
How it Affects:
An attacker can send specially crafted HTTP/2 requests to a vulnerable server and trigger excessive memory allocation.
As memory consumption increases:
- Server resources become exhausted.
- Applications may become slow or unresponsive.
- Legitimate users may be unable to access websites or services.
- Servers may crash or require manual intervention to recover.
- Business-critical web applications may experience downtime.
Unlike traditional volumetric DDoS attacks, HTTP/2 Bomb does not require large amounts of network traffic, making it difficult to detect based solely on bandwidth usage.
Who It Affects
This vulnerability affects organizations that:
- Expose HTTP/2-enabled web services to untrusted clients.
- Use vulnerable default configurations.
- Operate affected web servers directly on the Internet.
- Do not enforce strict header count limitations.
Organizations hosting public-facing web applications, APIs, reverse proxies, load balancers, and edge services are particularly exposed.
Its Impact :
Successful exploitation can:
- Cause complete service outages.
- Exhaust server memory within seconds.
- Prevent legitimate users from accessing applications.
- Trigger server instability or crashes.
- Increase operational and recovery costs.
- Impact customer experience and business operations.
Targeted Products:
| Product | Affected Version(s) | Status |
| nginx | Prior to 1.29.8 | Fixed |
| Apache HTTP Server (mod_http2) | Prior to mod_http2 v2.0.41 | Fixed |
| Microsoft IIS | Windows Server 2025 HTTP/2 deployments | No patch available at disclosure |
| Envoy Proxy | 1.37.2 and related releases | Patch released; validation ongoing |
| Cloudflare Pingora | Affected versions undisclosed | No patch available at disclosure |
Indicators of compromise:
There are currently no publicly available Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) specifically associated with HTTP/2 Bomb exploitation.
However, Security teams should monitor for:
Network Indicators
- Large numbers of HTTP/2 connections from a single source.
- Unusually long-lived HTTP/2 sessions.
- Repeated HTTP/2 requests with abnormal header patterns.
Server Indicators
- Rapid memory consumption without corresponding traffic increases.
- Unexpected spikes in RAM utilization.
- HTTP/2 worker process exhaustion.
- Application slowdowns or crashes.
- Increased numbers of stalled or incomplete HTTP/2 requests.
Log Indicators
- Excessive HTTP/2 stream creation.
- Persistent HTTP/2 connections that remain open for extended periods.
- Resource exhaustion warnings in web server logs.
Recommendations
Organizations should take the following actions immediately:
1. Apply Vendor Updates
- Upgrade NGINX to version 1.29.8 or later.
- Upgrade Apache mod_http2 to version 2.0.41 or later.
- Upgrade Envoy to the latest patched release.
2. Disable HTTP/2 Where Possible
For systems without available fixes, consider disabling HTTP/2 until vendor guidance becomes available.
3. Implement Reverse Proxy or WAF Protection
Deploy security controls that:
- Enforce strict header count limits.
- Inspect and filter malformed HTTP/2 traffic.
- Restrict abnormal connection behavior.
4.Implement Rate Limiting
- Restrict excessive HTTP/2 connections and streams per client.
- Apply connection throttling at load balancers and WAFs.
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